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From Regional Conflict to
Internal Reconstruction
MAKAU WA MUTUA
Projects Director of the Harvard Law School Human
Rights Program
ith the possible exception of the Horn of Africa, arguably no
other African region has been subject to multiple traumas
such as those endured by southern Africa. From the brutal
Portuguese colonization to the vicious civil wars in Angola and
Mozambique-not to mention the ravages of apartheid in South Africa
and Namibia-the last four hundred years have been remarkable for the
sheer brutality of man over fellow man. Yet, since 1990, there has been a
steady, if halting, reversal of the conditions that have historically engen-
dered violence in the region. In this article, I will examine this legacy and
the struggle to construct politically viable states from a human rights
dimension.
Over the last four decades, southern Africa-the region comprised
of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South
Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe-has been defined by apart-
heid, anti-colonialism, state despotism, and massive human rights viola-
tions. Except for Botswana-for many years the only democratic state-
no other country in the region has witnessed sustained periods of peace
and prosperity; however, in the last five years, democracy and reconcili-
ation have begun to engulf the region. Last April, South Africa, the most
powerful country in the area, rejected its racist past and started the slow
journey toward accountable government and racial equality. In 1990,
Namibians finally created an open society after decades of South African
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colonialism were terminated. In 1991, Zambia overcame Kenneth Kaunda's
one-party rule, and introduced a multiparty democracy.
In another unlikely turn of events-one of the most heartening
developments of the decade-Malawians forced Life-President Hastings
Kamuzu Banda to an electoral defeat, which was the first contested poll
since gaining independence from Britain in 1964. In Zimbabwe, plans for
a one-party system have long been abandoned, and opposition political
parties are organizing to cut into Robert Mugabe's monopoly on power.
Even in tiny Lesotho, the kingdom ensconced in South Africa's belly,
some halting progress has been made toward participatory politics. But
the greatest news comes from two of the region's most troubled countries,
Angola and Mozambique, where peace accords may end decades of some
of the most brutal civil conflicts on the continent.
Although this news is encouraging, the checkered history of the
post-colonial state in Africa provides reason for further reflection. The
failure of a number of states-such as Rwanda, Somalia, and Liberia-at
least raises the question of the viability of some of these post-colonial
entities, which were originally created for the expediency of European
colonialism and expansion. Can democracy and respect for human rights
take hold within political societies, including those in southern Africa,
that lack the essential requirements-a distinct nationalistic identity and
loyalty, commitment to a national interest by governing classes, a history
of tolerance-of real and empirical statehood?
The Slaying of the Beast: A New South Africa
Two often interrelated phenomena have primarily determined the
course of recent history in southern Africa. The first, and probably the
most important, was the institution of apartheid in South Africa and
Namibia and the external effects of that policy in neighboring states. The
second, which enjoyed the support of both South Africa and the industrial
democracies of the West, was Portuguese colonialism in Angola and
Mozambique. The former played a critical role in the destabilization of
Angola and Mozambique following the defeat and withdrawal of the
Portuguese colonizers. More than anything else, South Africa's huge
economy, its military might, and the internal and regional struggle
against apartheid defined the region.
For centuries, South Africa has been the epitome of racial inequal-
ity. A snapshot will suffice to show this. The cornerstone of Grand
Apartheid, which has been the subject of in-depth studies for decades,
was the legal and actual treatment of South Africans based on race and the
color of their skin. Under it, two countries-one white, the other black-
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were constructed. 86 percent of
all land was reserved exclusively The legacy of apartheid is
for the white minority while guaranteed to keep millions
blacks were permitted on only 14
percent, although they consti- of black South Africans
tuted over 70 percent of the locked out of the techno-
country's population. Blacks logical advantages of the
were bunched into ten "reserves," advntaes
unproductive patches of land twentieth century.
called the homelands, each des-
tined to become "independent." Denied virtually all basic human rights,
including the right to participate in government, blacks were subjected to
mass illegal detentions, killings by security forces, and forced removals.
The gross inequalities between blacks and whites in education, property
ownership, and health were astounding. This legacy of apartheid is
guaranteed to keep millions of black South Africans locked out of the
technological advantages of the twentieth century.
It was against these inhumane and racist policies that domestic
anti-apartheid activists such as the labor movement, the youth, human
rights groups, lawyers, and civic groups organized mass protests despite
harsh repression by the Boer regime. By the mid-70s, it became increas-
ingly clear that, unless the Afrikaners allowed independent political
activity, unbanned key political groups-such as the African National
Congress (ANC), the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), and the South
African Communist Party (SACP)-the country would implode. While
the state responded to cries for freedom with an iron fist, by detaining and
killing thousands of black children, the international community, with
the exception of the major industrial democracies of the West-such as
the United States and Great Britain-further isolated the apartheid re-
gime, and called for immediate steps towards majority rule. The ANC,
which was the pre-eminent opponent of apartheid, broadened its interna-
tional clout beyond the front-line states-the black-ruled nations neigh-
boring South Africa except Malawi-and the Soviet Union and its Eastern
European satellites.
In the United States, under the able leadership of African-American
advocates Randall Robinson of Transafrica and Gay McDougall,1 then
director of the Southern Africa Project of the Lawyers Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law, the anti-apartheid lobby mobilized American public
and legislative opinion against Ronald Reagan's constructive engage-
ment, the policy which justified subtle American support for apartheid.2
It argued that punitive sanctions were necessary to convince the Boers
that apartheid had to be abandoned. In 1986, the US Congress rejected
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constructive engagement, and overwhelmingly overrode Reagan's veto
to pass the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. The passage of that law
convinced the intransigent Boers that apartheid was doomed.
From 1986 onwards, both domestic and international pressure
mounted as calls increased for the release of Nelson Mandela, this
century's most important prisoner. Although Pretoria continued to crack
down hard on its opponents, its also started to contemplate the end of
apartheid. In 1990, the unthinkable happened: Nelson Mandela was
freed, and the ANC and other political groups were legalized. Negotia-
tions between the ruling National
The introduction of black Party and the ANC produced an
majority rule will not alone interim constitution, and in April
1994 in the country's first freely
reverse the inequalities contested all-race elections, the
wrought by apartheid, or ANC captured just under two
change overnight the abusive thirds of the vote. In an improb-
able twist of fate, Nelson
conduct of the country's Mandela became president with
security forces. F. W. de Klerk, the last president
of the apartheid era, as the sec-
ond vice president in a government of national unity.
But the introduction of black majority rule will not alone reverse
the inequalities wrought by apartheid, or change overnight the abusive
conduct of the country's security forces. In other words, the culture and
ethos of human rights remain a distant dream that all South Africans must
work towards. In almost every conceivable situation-and South Africa
is the classic example-human rights abuses result from the struggle over
power and resources. To alleviate them and create institutions which
protect basic freedoms, a nation must at the very least provide broad
sectors of the citizenry with a stable livelihood and an optimum measure
of equality before its laws.
In the case of South Africa, political democracy must be followed
in the not too distant future by economic democracy-that is, equality in
the nation's economic life. A comprehensive and equitable land-reform
program coupled with a radical restructuring of the economy in employ-
ment, access to capital, and allocation of public resources are unavoidable
if the young experiment with freedom is to succeed. This is the only basis
on which the tradition of violence and disregard for basic human rights
could be overcome. It remains to be seen, however, whether the Mandela
government has the political will and the ability to forge a unified,
prosperous nation from the ruins of apartheid, given the domination of
the economy and the security apparatuses by the white minority.
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War Fatigue: New Horizons in Angola and Mozambique
The tragedy of Portuguese colonialism in Angola and Mozambique
was compounded by its longevity, the underdevelopment of Portugal
itself, and the manner of its withdrawal. In Mozambique, after a lengthy
and brutal anti-colonial war, FRELIMO, the national liberation move-
ment, took over a devastated economy after the Portuguese beat a hasty
retreat following the military coup in Lisbon in 1974. The first African
government, which professed Marxism, immediately ran into opposition
from South Africa and some beneficiaries of the colonial era. Not
surprisingly, the new government was an outspoken opponent of apart-
heid and a supporter of South African liberation movements.
Born during the Cold War, independent Mozambique chose the
Soviet Union as its patron. Its domestic policies, based on experimental
scientific socialism, failed to create the necessary conditions for economic
takeoff. The basic needs of most Mozambicans went unmet as economic
indicators showed an economy on the brink of collapse. These economic
difficulties were compounded-some might say created-by Rhodesian
and South African destabilization campaigns, especially their orchestra-
tion and support for RENAMO,3 the rebel conservative movement led by
former colonialists and their African collaborators.
Soon after independence in 1974, the FRELIMO government
granted refuge and bases to Zimbabwean liberation movements fighting
against the Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia. The white Rhodesian army in
turn augmented its raids into Mozambique in pursuit of the freedom
fighters by sponsoring the then little known Mozambican National
Resistance (MNR)-later renamed RENAMO-a collection of colonists
opposed to FRELIMO. Upon attaining independence in 1980, the new
Zimbabwean government under Robert Mugabe obviously cut its links
with RENAMO.4 South Africa immediately and dramatically increased
its military and logistical support for RENAMO, making it a credible
fighting force and a real threat to the FRELIMO state. Although
Mozambique was pressured by South Africa into a non-aggression pact
in 1984, the Boer regime's covert support for RENAMO continued un-
abated.5
Over the years, RENAMO occupied large tracts of territory in a
war which, between 1975 and 1992, claimed the lives of over seven
hundred thousand Mozambicans. Although both sides committed abuses
during the war, human rights organizations have singled out RENAMO
as the party most responsible for many of the killings. As expected by
many students of southern Africa, the first signs that the war in
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Mozambique was directly linked to
Since 1974, when Portu- South Africa's internal politics
gal bolted from Angola, started to emerge in 1990. As South
that nation has resembled Africa legalized its liberation move-ments, RENAMO indicated its will-
a living hell. ingness to consider a cease-fire. In
1992, both sides initialed a cease-
fire, and in October 1994, RENAMO took part in the country's first
multiparty elections.
Initial election results indicated that Joaquim Chissano, FRELIMO's
presidential candidate and the current head of state, would beat a strong
challenge by Afonso Dhlakama, the head of RENAMO. Although
Dhlakama agreed to participate in the elections after threatening to pull
out altogether, doubts remain as to whether he will accept defeat and
refrain from reigniting the war. If Chissano wins-as is projected-he is
expected to offer RENAMO leaders several positions in a government of
national unity. Mozambique, one of the poorest countries in the world,
desperately needs peace, reconciliation, and compromise between
FRELIMO and RENAMO if it going to turn the leaf cn its long history-
starting with colonial rule four centuries ago-of gross and massive
human rights violations.
The international community certainly hopes that Mozambique
will not mimic Angola in an elusive quest for peace. Since 1974, when
Portugal bolted from Angola, that nation has resembled a living hell. In
January, 1975 Portugal and Angola's three liberation movements-the
MPLA, the FNLA, and the UNITA6-agreed to set up a transitional
government, and to hold elections that October, prior to formal indepen-
dence in November. But in February, 1975 the FNLA, with the encourage-
ment of the United States and President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire,
launched attacks against the Marxist MPLA, an event which set off the
long Angolan tragedy. Although the CIA had initially funneled covert
aid to the FNLA, it soon switched its support to UNITA, seeing in Jonas
Savimbi a more dependable satellite for preventing the MPLA from
coming to power. In response, MPLA invited the support of thousands
of Cuban troops and Soviet advisors. A year later, the MPLA had
decisively won and pushed UNITA and the FNLA to the fringes of the
countryside.
But South African, American, and Soviet support for the proxy war
continued until the Soviet Union collapsed, and South Africa renounced
apartheid. In 1992, after millions of Angolans were either killed or
maimed-with UNITA committing the most unspeakable violations-
both sides agreed to a freely contested election. When UNITA's Jonas
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Savimbi lost to the MPLA's Jose Eduardo dos Santos, he rejected the poll
considered by international observers to be free and fair. He immediately
restarted the civil war in which thousands more have been killed. Lacking
the support of its former patrons, UNITA suffered heavy losses and lost
huge chunks of the territory it has controlled for years. In the aftermath,
peace talks in November 1994 led to an agreement designed to end the
twenty-year civil war. Some reports indicate that if peace materializes,
Savimbi may be named vice president. Angola, one of the resource-richest
countries in the world,7 could soon embark on national reconstruction
and reconciliation, if reason overcomes the greed for power.
Emerging Democracies: Malawi and Zambia Reject Despotism
More than any other region of Africa, southern Africa is witnessing
a slow but clear trend towards more tolerant and democratic political
societies. The Kingdom of Lesotho now has a democratically elected
government after decades of iron-fisted rule. In Zimbabwe, although
Robert Mugabe's ZANU-PF8 has dominated politics since independence
in 1980, other political parties are now allowed to compete for political
power. Where it appeared once that the one-party state would be
imposed, political participation and expressive rights have continued to
expand, though the state still restricts basic human rights. Since gaining
independence from South Africa, Namibia has continued its steady
construction of a democratic society based on the rule of law. Apart from
South Africa, the two most prominent indications of the rejection of the
repressive past are Malawi and Zambia.
In 1990, Zambians opposed to Kenneth Kaunda's one-party, re-
pressive rule took advantage of the winds of change sweeping Africa, and
formed the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). Under the
leadership of Frederick Chiluba, the charismatic former trade unionist,
the MMD campaigned on a human rights platform by exposing the abuse
of power by security forces, corruption by state officials, and the denial of
speech and political participation rights. Although the government
resisted change at first, it quickly allowed independent political activity
and scheduled elections for October 1991. In those elections, Chiluba and
the MMD resoundingly defeated Kaunda at the presidential and parlia-
mentary levels. In a move rarely witnessed in post-colonial Africa,
Kaunda graciously stepped down, and is now a leading figure in the
opposition.
Malawi's transition to democracy was more troubled. After inde-
pendence, the Malawian government established and maintained control
over its citizens by requiring absolute loyalty to its leaders, and by
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terrorizing those who would speak against it. The most common abuses
included "disappearances," torture in custody, judicial interference, and
the punitive confiscation of property. Life-President Hastings Kamuzu
Banda exercised total control through the Malawi Congress Party (MCP),
the sole legal political party, and the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP), a
paramilitary unit with wide powers of arrest. Of the black-ruled states in
the region, his was distinguished by the brutality of his rule and his
collaboration with apartheid South Africa.
It is not surprising, once again, that Malawi's transformation
closely followed the democratization process in South Africa. In, June
1993, after the failure of the regime to silence pro-democracy advocates,
Malawi became one of the last African countries below the Sahara to
officially adopt multipartyism, after losing by two thirds a referendum to
end repressive one-party rule. The speed and scope of change from then
on has been dramatic and impressive. Opposition political parties were
licensed and human rights groups sprung up. Independent newspapers
were started and a new constitution with a bill of rights adopted. Deten-
tion laws were scrapped and courts started to render judgments support-
ive of human rights. To crown these achievements, the United Demo-
cratic Front (UDF) won presidential and legislative elections in May 1994.
The MCP peacefully stepped down and formed the largest opposition
party. Banda, now his late nineties, is an ordinary citizen. The new
government has indicated its intention to nurture institutions that pro-
mote basic freedoms.
Conclusion: Hope and Fear
Pessimists would find some difficulty in dismissing the movement
towards more tolerant societies in southern Africa, even though the jury
is still out on whether peace accords in Angola and Mozambique will
hold. But are the experiments with democracy in South Africa, Zambia,
Malawi, Namibia, Lesotho, Botswana, and Zimbabwe bound to take root
or are they easily reversible? Are democratization and an ethos for the
respect of human rights merely a fad whose staying power in Africa is
unpredictable or even an impossibility? Is it possible under Africa's
current state structures and political culture to create politically demo-
cratic and economically viable states?
Recently these questions have been brought into sharp relief by a
new phenomenon-the failure of the African post-colonial state in coun-
tries as diverse as Rwanda, Somalia, and Liberia. Could the potential for
the revival of Angola and Mozambique be a counter-trend on which the
hopes of Africans could rest, or are they aberrations from which no
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patterns should be read? Africa's current problems stem primarily from
an event which took place in Berlin in 1885. There, major European
powers carved up Africa for the convenience of their colonization. With-
out regard to pre-existing political boundaries and entities, demographic
and ethnic variables, and geographic factors and historical alliances, they
created several dozen countries almost overnight. Africans suddenly had
to live in bounded areas with contrived citizenries.
These colonial states could not forge nationalistic loyalties and
identities because they were unnatural and forced. Sadly, the post-colonial
state suffers from the same problems-it inherited wholesale the colonial
state. It is no wonder that Africans usually lack an instinctual bond to the
state; it is an alien imposition. Those who become rulers lack a national
interest, and only seek power to pillage the state. In the process they resort
to human rights violations against their fellow citizens in order to retain
control. They cynically present themselves-until recently, in the form of
the party-state-as the "guarantors" of "national unity" and "develop-
ment." Those who question them or advocate independent viewpoints
are stigmatized as "enemies of the state."
Once the superpower patrons in the late 1980s withdrew support
from this impenetrable terrorist organization parading as a state, at the
end of the cold war, it failed to withstand popular demands for liberaliza-
tion. Soon it was faced with a choice: either it would spin out of control
because citizens attacked it, because of its own paranoia or because it
succumbed to demands for democratization; if it resisted change, ethnic,
social, and economic cleavages would burst open, pitting citizen against
citizen. In this event, it prosecuted the genocidal war in Rwanda, Somalia,
Sudan, and Liberia. The lessons offered by the post-colonial state point
to its fragility and the need to reconfigure Africa's political map if the state
is going to become a viable form of organizing political society. One
possibility could be redrawing Africa's colonial boundaries. Another
could be the creation of regional economic unions with loose political
confederations.
For southern Africa-including South Africa with its developed
industrial base-these challenges remain real. Although countries in the
region are states juridically, they lack the other essential ingredients of
stable statehood, such as political classes with a firm commitment to the
nation, a citizenry that is loyal to the idea of the state and the country, and
a viable base for economic development. Unless emergent democracies
develop these variables, the experiment with open and free societies may
soon turn sour. Human rights can only be secured when these fundamen-
tal questions on the viability of the state are successfully addressed. 0
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Notes
'Gay McDougall, a graduate of Yale Law School, has for over two decades worked for
human rights and democracy in South Africa. The Executive Director of the Interna-
tional Human Rights Law Group since September 1994, she was one of five foreigners,
and the sole American, named to the Independent Electoral Commission, the body that
organized, monitored, and supervised South Africa's first all-race elections in April
1994.
2Constructive engagement was crafted by Chester Crocker, Reagan's Assistant Secre-
tary of State for African Affairs from 1981 to 1989. This geopolitical Cold War strategy
rested on several pillars including the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola in
return for Namibian independence, diplomatic and military support for UNITA-the
terrorist Angolan rebel movement-to oust the Soviet-backed MPLA government in
Luanda, and the maintenance of South African hegemony in the region.
'RENAMO is the Portuguese acronym for Mozambican National Resistance or Resistancia
Nacional Mocambicana.
4The Mugabe government in fact supported the FRELIMO government in its war against
RENAMO. Were it not for South African support, RENAMO would have been choked
by the two states.
5The Nkomati Accord of 1984 formally committed Mozambique to end its support for
the ANC and other South African liberator movements in exchange for South African
termination of its patronage of RENAMO.
6The MPLA is the Portuguese acronym for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola or the Movimento Popular de libertacao de Angola; the FNLA was the National
Front for the Liberation of Angola or the Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola; and
UNITA is the Union for the Total Liberation of Angola or the Uniao Nacional para a
Independencia Total de Angola.
7Angola has huge oil deposits, diamonds, and very fertile farmlands.
8ZANU-JPF is the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front, the ruling party.
The Brown Journal of World Affairs
